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COMMENTS
THE AUTHORIZATION OF WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING
BY THE PRESIDENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY
MATTERS INVOLVING DOMESTIC
DISSIDENTS
WILLIAM F. McQUILLEN

In a recent address to the nation's police chiefs, the Attorney General stated that wiretapping is the "most valuable" federal crime tool.1
This "tool" is presently being employed without judicial authorization
in matters which the Attorney General considers as affecting "national
security. ' The scope of "national security" has not been determined
but it does include some domestic dissident organizations as well as
,hostile foreign powers. 3 In four recent federal trials, the Government
has contended that the President has the constitutional power and legislative authorization to wiretap in domestic matters affecting the national
security.4 The Government has liberally construed Title 3, Section

2511(3) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 5 to in-

clude any internal organization which poses a threat to the present
existence and structure of the Government. The adversaries
theory of warrantless wiretapping admit that the President has to this
plenary
powers in the area 0of foreign affairs, but emphasize that he is limited
in domestic matters.
[I]n wholly domestic situations there is no national security exemption from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Since there is no reason why the government could not have complied with this requirement by obtaining the impartial judgment
of a court before conducting the electronic surveillance in ques-7
tion here, it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
18 Cr. L. Rep. 2059 (1970).

2 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971); United
States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); United States v. O'Neal,
Criminal No. KC-CR-1204 (D. Kan., September 1, 1970); United States v. Brown, 317 F.
Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for
cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1970) (No. 783); United States v. Dellinger,
Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970).
3 ld.
4 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971); United
States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); United States v. O'Neal,
Criminal No. KC-CR-1204 (D. Kan., September 1, 1970); United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970).
5 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (Supp. IV 1965-8).
6 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971); United
States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
7 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 12 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); citing
United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 10 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
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Further, the exceptions enumerated in Omnibus, concerning the Attorney General authorizing wiretapping in certain cases of national
security, are ineffectual since "the President is, of course, still subject
to the Constitutional limitations imposed upon him by the Constitution."s
THE AUTHORIZATION OF WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING BY THE
PRESIDENT FROM THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF

1934,

UNTIL THE OMNIBUS

CRIME

STREETS ACT OF

CONTROL AND SAFE

1968

Although Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act prohibits
the interception and divulgence or use of any wire communication by
federal agents, 9 it was interpreted to prohibit wiretapping only
when followed by divulgence. Divulgence was said to be the introduction at trial of wiretapping evidence and did not include correspondence within the Department of Justice.' 0 Consequently, wiretapping
continued but was not introduced as evidence in trials. In 1940, President Roosevelt issued a directive clarifying the Government's position concerning wiretapping in cases involving the "national security."'"
The President stated that he agreed with the Supreme Court policy
contained in Nardone v. United States12 but added that he felt sure
that the Court did not intend the ban to apply to grave matters involving the national defense.' 8 He stated that federal agents are not
precluded from using electronic eavesdropping in investigations against
"fifth column" subversive organizations. 14 The President further commented that he recognized the possible abuse of wiretapping in civil
rights matters and expressly limited the Government's use of wiretapping in national security cases.
You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may
approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to authorize
the necessary investigating agents that they are at liberty to secure
information by listening devices directed to the conversation or
other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities
against the Government of the United States, including suspected
s id. at 6, citing United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 12 (E.D. Mich., January
26, 1971).
947 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
10 Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197 (1954).
11 Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L.R. 749, 759 (1968), citing memorandum From
President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, Stephen Speingarn Papers.
12 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937), rev'd and remanded 308 U.S. 338, 60
S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).
18 Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L.R. 749, 757 (1968), citing memorandum From
President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, Stephen Speingarn Papers.
14 Id.
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spies. You are requested furthermore to limit these investigations
so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible
to aliens.15
An expanded version of this directive was issued by President Truman
in 1946. The directive specified federal use of electronic eavesdropping
in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security, or where human life
is in jeopardy."' 0 President Truman's directive omitted any reference
to the restriction President Roosevelt had imposed. The authority of
the President to issue such a directive was not challenged in the courtroom since the directive authorized wiretapping for investigatory
reasons and not for evidentiary purposes. During this period, there
were numerous attempts to pass legislation which specifically excluded
"national security" cases from the Federal Communications Act. x7

No Congressional bill was enacted but the policy of reading an exception
into the act continued. The Attorney General continued to authorize
wiretapping when he felt that particular activities affected the national
security of the country.' 8 It was not until 1967 that a substantial change
occurred in the use of wiretapping by federal authorities. The Attorney
General issued a memorandum which ordered the discontinuance of all
federal wiretapping whether for evidentiary or investigatory purposes.' 9
He reaffirmed the policy of the Federal Communications Act but the
limited national security exception was included.
[N]ational security investigations shall continue to be taken up
with the
Attorney General in the light of existing stringent restric20
tions .

In 1968, an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 statutorily regulated wiretapping for the first time since the Federal Communications Act of 1934.21 Section 2511 made any unauthorized
surveillance a serious crime. Electronic eavesdropping was authorized
by the magistrate only after determining if there was sufficient probable cause. However, the act contained two exceptions:
15 Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
16 Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic.Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception. 14 WAYNE L.R. 749, 761 (1968) (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 761, 763. In 1951, 1953, 1954, 1958, and 1959, specific legislation was introduced
and hearings held concerning legislation of wiretapping in "national security" cases.
18 Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1954). Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An
Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L.R. 749 (1968).
19 Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L.R. 749, 755 (1968), citing Attorney General
Ramsey Clark's memorandum which ordered the cessation of wiretapping without his
permission.
20 Id.

21 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (Supp. 1965-8). The wiretapping section
of the amendment is referred to as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act.
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1. 2518(7). Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,
any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting
attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to
a statute of that State who reasonably determines that(a) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspiratorial
activities threatening the national security interest or to
conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime
that requires a wire or oral communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can
with due diligence be obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered
under this chapter to authorize such interception,....
2. 2511(3). Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of
the Communications Act of 1934 . . .shall limit the constitu-

tional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or against hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the
overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful
means, or against any clear and present danger to the 'structure or existence of the Government.
WIRETAPPING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FROM
OLMSTEAD V. UNITED STATES (1928) UNTIL
KATZ V. UNITED STATES (1967)22

In

Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that

wiretapping was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amend22Although historically wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping have been treated
differently, two recent Supreme Court decisions concerned with eavesdropping did not attempt to distinguish between the two. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507,
19 L. Ed.2d 576 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed.2d 1040
(1967). For the purposes of this comment, the terms will be used interchangeably, however,
the historical development will be concerned only with pure wiretapping, that is, an
invasion of conversation without a physical intrusion of any property. For a discussion
of the unfolding of personal rights protected by the fourth amendment and the prior
distinction between wiretapping and electronic surveillance, see Comment, The Fourth
Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping For the Future, 53 VA. L. REV. 1314 (1967); Comment, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment, 50
MINN. L. REV. 378 (1965); Comment, Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, the Federal
Exclusionary Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38 U. DET. L.J. 635 (1961); Symposium, The
Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: Reflections on Eavesdropping, 44 MINN. L. REV. 811
(1960).
Subsequent to the submission of this Comment, the Supreme Court in United States
v. White (9 Cr.L.Rep. 3037-April 5, 1971) ruled that electronic eavesdropping on a
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ment.2 3 The majority opinion, stated that a conversation passing over a

telephone wire cannot be said to come within the constitutionally protected area of the fourth amendment. "The Amendment does not
forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no
seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only." 24 There is no violation of the fourth amendment unless "there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible/material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house or 'curtilage' for the purpose of making
a seizure." 25 Further the Court stated:
Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages
by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in
federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from
the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such
a policy by attributing
an enlarged and unusual meaning to the
26
Fourth Amendment.

Six years later, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act
which had the effect of prohibiting the admissibility of all evidence
obtained by wiretap. Although there is some doubt regarding the real
intent of Section 605 of the Act, Nardone v. United States found pro'27
hibition of wiretapping to be the "plain mandate of the statute.
The Court in Nardone stated that the prohibition should not be read
narrowly as to stultify the provision but should be read to effectuate
2
the policy which Congress has formulated.

The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall29 not
be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all.
In Benanti v. United States,3 0 1957, Chief Justice Warren found a clear
violation of Section 605 of the Communications Act, and therefore,
conversation with the connivance of one of the parties is not violative of the fourth
amendment. This decision does not appear to re-establish the distinction between wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping except when the latter involves an agent or informer.

25 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928).
24 Id. at 464, 48 S. Ct. at 568, 72 L. Ed. at 950.
25 Id. at 466, 48 S. Ct. at 568, 72 L. Ed. at 951.
26 Id. at 465-66, 48 S. Ct. at 568, 72 L. Ed. at 951.
27 Hendricks, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping, and the Law of Search and Seizure-Some
Implications of the Katz Decision, 9 ARMz. L. REV. 428, 438 (1968).
28 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937), rev'd and remanded 308 U.S. 338, 60
S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).
29 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 267, 84 L. Ed. 307, 311 (1939), citing Silverstorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920).
This is referred to as the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine."
80 355 U.S. 96, 78 S. Ct. 155, 2 L. Ed.2d 126 (1957).
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refused to determine if the wiretap evidence was acquired in violation
of the fourth amendment. "[C]onfronted as we are by this clear statute,
and resting our decision on its provisions, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to discuss by analogy distinctions suggested to be applica32
ble to the Fourth Amendment."'1 In Silverman v. United States,
1961, the Court found that federal agents had not violated the Communications Act but had violated the fourth amendment. The agents
had inserted a foot-long electronic listening device into the wall of
the defendant's alleged gambling establishment. The Court stated
that this act constituted an unauthorized physical penetration into
private premises, without warrant, thus violative of the fourth amendment. 3 Although this decision did not have any effect on Olmstead,
Nardone or Benanti because it involved a trespass; the decision was farreaching for it was the first time the Court found a violation of the
fourth amendment in electronic surveillance cases. Six years later,
Katz v. United States34 reversed Olmstead and held that wiretapping
is violative of the fourth amendment unless there is antecedent judicial
authorization. The Court determined that the fourth amendment
35
protects persons and not just places.
[T]he reach of that Amendment- [Fourth] cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure .... The Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate
the wall of the
0
booth can have no constitutional significance.3
Katz recognized but left for future resolution the issue of "whether
safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security.' '3
THE PRESIDENT'S INHERENT POWER To CONDUCT ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY CASES
INVOLVING FOREIGN RELATIONS

An idea which seems to permeate much of the Government's argument is that a dissident domestic organization is akin to an un-

31Id.

at 102, 78 S. Ct. at 158, 2 L. Ed.2d at 131.

32 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed.2d 734 (1961).
33 Id.

84 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed.2d 576 (1967).
351d..at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511, 19 L. Ed.2d at 582.
36 Id. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at 512, 19 L. Ed.2d at 583.
37Id. at 358, n.23, 88 S. Ct. at 515, n.23, 19 L. Ed.2d at 586, n.23.
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friendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the same
38
fashion.
The Government contends that because the President has plenary
and exclusive powers in the field of foreign affairs, he can authorize
warrantless wiretapping against any organization or any individual
who conducts activities which adversely affect the national security of
the country. Acknowledging that the President "possess[es] no power
not derived from the Constitution, '39 the Government asserts that
the President's power to act in foreign intelligence matters emanates
from the constitutional grant of executive powers in Article II Section
1 and Article II Section 2.40
The government contends that Section 1 vests in the President the
power to take whatever action necessary to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution. Section 2 is said to designate the President
as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations."
As early as 1875, 4 ' the Supreme Court recognized the power of the
President to employ secret agents to enter rebel lines to obtain intelligence information. In the same year, the Court stated that the President was "constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile
operations. '42 In 1936, the Supreme Court stated "with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone
' 43
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
In 1937, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision .... 44
In 1939, the question of deportation was said to be "for the executive,
It ought to be left to the untrammeled decision of
not the judge ....
the executive . .. . The executive has exclusive supervision of international relations." 45 In Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
Steamship Corporation,46 1948, the Supreme Court stated that all
38 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 9 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
89Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25, 87 L. Ed. 3, 11, 63 S. Ct. 2, 10 (1942).
40 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); United
States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970).
41 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105, 23 L. Ed. 605 (1875).
42 Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87, 22 L. Ed. 528,531 (1875).
43 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319, 57 S. Ct. 216, 220, 81
L. Ed. 255, 262 (1936).
44 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328, 57 S. Ct. 748, 759, 81 L. Ed. 1134, 1138
(1937).
This comment is concerned only with the President's power in foreign affairs and does
not undertake to discuss or analyze a comparison of the President's constitutional powers
versus the Congressional power in foreign matters.
45 United States v. Carollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 7 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
46 333 U.S. 103, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948).
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applications to engage in foreign air transportation were subject to
approval by the President.
That aerial navigation routes and bases should be prudently correlated with facilities and plans for our own national defenses
and raise new problems4 in conduct of foreign relations, is a fact
of common knowledge. T
The Court stated that "whatever of this order emanates from the President is not susceptible of review by the Judicial Department. ' ' 48
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It
would be intolerable that courts, without relevant information,
should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken
49
on information properly held secret.
In 1959, the presidential power in foreign affairs was said to extend to
travel restrictions.5 0 A newspaperman's passport was denied because
he refused to agree to a provision forbidding travel in five communist
countries. The court stated that this was a foreign matter and the
Constitution places that task in the hands of the Executive. "It is settled
that in respect to foreign affairs the President has the power of action
and the courts will.not attempt to review the merits of what he does.
The President is the nation's organ in and for foreign affairs."51
Although the powers of the President "have never been specifically
defined, and in fact cannot be, since their extent and limitations are
largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances, ' 52 the power
of the President to. act in foreign affairs to provide for national security,
has historically always been recognized by the courts.
EXPANSIONARY 'EFFECT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ON THE
PRESIDENT'S POWER TO AUTHORIZE WARRANTLESS
WIRETAPPING IN MATTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In cases subsequent to Katz, courts have been inclined to affirm the
President's power in foreign matters but the reasoning of the courts
has undergone a change as a result of the fourth amendment expansion
to "protect people and not just places." In Alderman v. United States,5 3
the Supreme Court held that the Government must disclose and make
47 Id. at 108,
48 Id. at 112,
49 Id. at 111,
50 Worthy v.

68 S.Ct. at 434, 92 L. Ed. at 574.

68 S. Ct. at 436, 92 L. Ed. at 576.
68 S. Ct. at 436, 92 L. Ed. at 576.

Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
51Id. at 911.
52 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 343, 347 (1939).
53 394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct.961, 22 L. Ed.2d 176 (1969).
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available to the defendant any conversation he participated in or
which occurred on his premises and which was overheard during the
course of an illegal surveillance. Although the Supreme Court did
not specify what standards would be constitutional in the gathering
of foreign intelligence, the Court did remand certain cases involved
in foreign affairs to allow the district court to determine their legality. 54
None of the subsequent decisions by the district courts declared that
the President lacked the power to authorize warrantless wiretapping
in national security matters, but the reasoning differed among the
courts. The district courts in United States v. O'Baugh5 5 and United
States v. Stone,56 stated that the wiretapping occurred prior to Katz,
therefore the Olmstead rule was in effect. 57 The courts stated that
United States v. Desist58 declared Katz wholly prospective thereby
obviating the necessity of determining the constitutionality of the wiretap.

59

The district court in United States v. Butenko6 ° declared: "[T]he
legitimate needs of law enforcement will, under certain circumstances,
justify an exception to the general warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment."6 1
The very nature of the operation here involved, and the objective
sought to be accomplished thereby, would certainly seem to justify
an exception to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It is undisputed ... that wiretapping to protect6 2the national
security has been authorized by successive Presidents.
In United States v. Cassius Clay and United States v. H. Rap Brown,
the courts found that the evidence obtained in the warrantless wiretap
was not constitutionally prohibited, therefore the government did not
have to allow the defendant an examination of all the logs.6 3 To make
this determination each court intermingled two independent arguments and decided that, considered together, there was sufficient
grounds for denying the defendant's motions to suppress under Katz
and to discover under Alderman.64 The courts in Clay and Brown
54 Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S. Ct. 1164, 22 L. Ed.2d 297 (1969).
55 United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767, 768 (D. D.C. 1969).
56 United States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75, 80 (D. D.C. 1969).
57 Id.
58 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 22 L. Ed.2d 248, rehearing denied,
395 U.S. 931, 89 S. Ct. 1766, 23 L. Ed.2d 251 (1969).
59 United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767 (D. D.C. 1969); United States v. Stone, 305
F. Supp. 75 (D. D.C. 1969).
60 318 F. Supp. 66 (D. N.J. 1970).
61 Id. at 71.
62 Id. at 71.
63 United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W.
3228 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1970) (No. 783); United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1970).
64

Id.
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balanced the rights of the defendant and the security of the nation and
decided it would be intolerable for courts to nullify actions of the
President taken on information properly held secret. 65
[I]t is the executive and not the judiciary, which alone possesses
both the expertise and the factual background to assess the reasonableness of such a surveillance. From a purely practical standpoint,
it would be ridiculous to place on a U.S. Commissioner the burden
of deciding what is and is not a threat to national security.
The court does not believe the judiciary should question the
decision of the executive department that such surveillances are
reasonable and necessary to the protection of the national interest. 66
Both of these courts, held that the surveillance was lawful on the
ground that the President has power as the Commander-in-Chief to
authorize wiretapping for the purposes of gathering foreign information. 67 Although Alderman requires a disclosure of the contents of an
electronic surveillance to the defendant only when obtained illegally,
each court apparently felt compelled to substantiate the legality of the
surveillance by a method other than total reliance on the President's
constitutional power in foreign affairs. The courts made an "in camera" examination to determine if the defendants were prejudiced by
the electronic surveillance. The examination by the courts demonstrated
that the evidence was "untainted" and in no way prejudiced the defendant. The information was said to be "not germane to any issue in
this criminal prosecution," 6 and, "not one scintilla of evidence
...could have in any way tainted the evidence produced by the government during defendant's trial."6 9 In both Clay and Brown, the courts
based their decisions on these two arguments and in neither case is it
indicated that either argument, standing alone, would be sufficient.
Since Katz, the Government's claim of power to wiretap without
judicial authorization in foreign affairs has been upheld by the courts
for various reasons:
applicable in foreign affairs but the
1. The fourth amendment is 70
warrant requirement is excepted.
2. The combination of the President's powers as Commander-in71
Chief and the innocuous evidence obtained by the wiretap.
65 Id.

66 United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. La. 1970), citing United States v.
Clay, Criminal No. 67-11-94 (S.D. Tex., July 14, 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
67 United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 536 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Clay,
430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970).

68 United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970).
69 United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. La. 1970).
70 United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. N.J. 1970).
71 United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1970); United States v. Clay, 430
F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
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3. Katz is wholly prospective, therefore any governmental warrant-

72
less wiretapping conducted prior to Katz is lawful under Olmstead.

It appears that courts are reluctant to challenge the plenary and
unique power of the President in matters of foreign intelligence
since "numerous non-judicial factors are relevant and the decision
would probably be far removed from the consideration of probable
cause. ' 73 However, the President's power has been challenged in
matters of domestic affairs.
Unlike in the area of foreign affairs, in the area of domestic
polit74
ical activity the government can act only in limited ways.
CAN THE AUTHORITY

OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS

WIRETAPPING IN MATTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BE EXPANDED TO
INCLUDE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE DEEMED TO
CONSTITUTE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO
THE EXISTENCE AND STRUCTURE OF
THE GOVERNMENT?

Article II
There are fundamental differences in the origin and nature of the
power of the President in respect to foreign affairs and domestic affairs.
"The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect
the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs. ' 75 Since there is no undefined residuum of power
which the President can exercise when it seems to him to be in the
public interest, the President's powers to authorize wiretapping in
internal affairs without a warrant must be enumerated in the Consti7

tution. 6
The Government found such power in the provisions of Article II

which vest the executive power in the President. The President swears,
in taking his oath of office, that he shall faithfully execute the office
and will to the best of his ability preserve, protect and defend the
77
Constitution.
72 United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767, 768 (D. D.C. 1969); United States v. Stone,
305 F. Supp. 75, 80 (D. D.C. 1969).
73 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 10 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
74 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277 CD, 10 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971), citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed.2d 438 (1969).
75 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315, 57 S. Ct. 216, 219, 81
L. Ed. 255, 260 (1936).
76 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587, 72 S. Ct. 863, 866, 96
L. Ed. 1153, 1166 (1951).
77 Id.
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[A]ny President who takes seriously his oath to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution" will no doubt determine that it is
not "unreasonable" to utilize electronic surveillance to gather
intelligence information concerning those organizations which are
committed to the use of illegal methods to bring about changes
in our form of Government
and which may be seeking to foment
8
violent disorders.

It is further contended that the President's power to authorize wiretapping derives from his role as Commander-in-Chief. As the nation's
sole organ in foreign affairs the President is said to have the power to
take any action to defend against any clear and present danger to the
existence of the country.79 The contention is that the presidential
power should be implied from the aggregate of Article II Section 1
and Article II Section 2.80 The inherent powers of the President emanating from Article II were contrived in general terms and are not
subject to specific definition since their extent and limitations are
largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances. '"81 The Government contends that in matters which vitally affect the domestic security,
the conditions and circumstances justify reliance on the President's
inherent constitutional power to protect the nation. Therefore he has
the power: "(1) to authorize without a judicial warrant, electronic
surveillance in 'national security' cases; and (2) to determine unilaterally whether a given situation is a matter within the concept of national
security.1 s2 The Government further contends that domestic dissident

organizations are "akin to an unfriendly foreign power and must be
88
dealt with in the same fashion."
The adversaries to this theory of Presidential power as contained in
Article II contend that the Executive powers "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. 84 And, since Katz extended the scope
of the Constitution to include wiretapping, the President's executive
powers must not abridge the protections of the fourth amendment.
Further, the power of the President to act in internal matters is neither
expressly authorized in Article 2 nor can it be implied. Since all executive power is granted by the Constitution 5 and the Executive may not
78 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 6 (C.D. Cal., January 8,1971).
79 This was the government's contention in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1951) and United States v. Smith, Criminal No.
4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
80 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587, 72 S. Ct. 863, 866, 96
L. Ed. 1153, 1167 (1951).
81 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 343, 347 (1939).
82 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 5 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
83 Id. at 9.

84 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S. Ct. 216, 221,
81 L. Ed. 255, 262 (1936).

85Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25, 63 S. Ct. 2, 10, 87 L. Ed. 3, 11 (1942).
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usurp judicial functions, 86 then the Executive may not authorize wiretapping without judicial warrant nor determine unilaterally whether
87
a given situation is a matter within the concept of national security.
In response to the Government's assertion that domestic dissident
organizations should be treated in the same manner as a hostile foreign power, the opponents of governmental warrantless wiretapping
in internal affairs contend that the organizations are political and its
members should "receive equal justice regardless of their political
beliefs and persuasions.188 To treat the dissident organizations in the
same fashion as a foreign government is "to ride roughshod over
numerous political freedoms which have long received constitutional
protection."8 9 It is the expansion of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief into an area other than military matters and foreign
affairs.
In a Supreme Court decision, which restricted the power of the
President to act in internal affairs, the Court concluded that the President's power to act in national security cases did not include the power
to take possession of private property in order to prevent the stoppage
of production of steel. 90 The President had claimed that the strike
would endanger the national security of the country and that he had
the inherent power to take any action to safeguard and protect the
security of the country. 91 The Supreme Court stated that the President
does not have a residuum of power which he can exercise because it
seems to him to be in the national interest.9 2
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
. . . [W]e cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system
hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the
ultimate power ... to take possession of private property in order
to keep labor disputes from stopping production. .... 93
[O]ur history and traditions rebel at the thought that the grant of
94
military power carries with it authority over civilian affairs ....
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several
constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
86 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S. Ct. 357, 94 L. Ed. 401 (1950).
87 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
88 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 9 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
89 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 11 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
90 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed.
1153 (1952).
91 Id.
02 Id.

93 Id. at 587, 72 S. Ct. at 867, 96 L. Ed. at 1167.
94 Id. at 632, 72 S. Ct. at 888, 96 L. Ed. at 1197.
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to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker. .

.

.The President's order does not direct

that a Congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed
by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a
manner prescribed by the President. .... 5
If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the President,
we would be expanding Article 2 of the Constitution and rewriting it to suit political conveniences of the present emergency. 96
The Interpretation of "Unreasonable Searches"
A further contention in the Government's defense of warrantless
wiretapping is that the fourth amendment forbids only "unreasonable
searches" and the use of a warrant is only one means of insuring that
the search was reasonable. 97 The Government asserts that it is not unreasonable to authorize wiretapping against organizations who seek to
subvert the existing structure of the Government, just as it is not unreasonable to conduct a search without warrant incident to an arrest
and to conduct a "frisk" without prior judicial authorization. The
contention is the interpretation of "reasonableness" must be construed
in a "practical" manner.9 8
In United States v. Rabinowitz,9 9 the Court agreed that the test of
the fourth amendment is determined by the facts and circumstances
and not by any fixed formula. "The Constitution does not define what
are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have
no ready made litmus-paper test."' 100 This case was subsequently overruled in Chimel v. California'0 and the dissent by Justice Frankfurter
in Rabinowitz has been adopted.
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches"
and then went on to define the very restricted authority that even
a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers
said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is "unit, barring only exceptions
reasonable" unless a warrant authorizes
10 2
justified by absolute necessity.
The Government's assertion has been expressly overruled by Chimel
as being an undefined analysis which merely makes "reasonableness"
95 Id. at 587, 72 S. Ct. at 867, 96 L. Ed. at 1167.
96Id. at 632, 72 S. Ct. at 887, 96 L. Ed. at 1197.
97 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
98 1d.
99 399 US. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1949).
100 id. at 63, 70 S.Ct. at 434, 94 L. Ed. at 659.
101 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed.2d 685 (1969).
102 339 U.S. 56, 70, 70 S. Ct. 430, 437, 94 L. Ed. 653, 662 (1949).
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a subjective viewpoint and in effect, evaporates the protection the
fourth amendment was designed to afford. 0 3
Omnibus
Another issue raised by the Government is that the President can
authorize warrantless wiretapping under the authority of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The contention is that Section
2511(3) of Omnibus constitutes Congressional recognition of the President's authority to take whatever actior necessary to protect the nation
against a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government. 10 4 Those opposed to this theory contend that the President's power must always be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the Constitution.
Since the President's conduct is "responsible to the Constitution,"'0 5
Omnibus cannot exempt him from the warrant requirements of the
fourth amendment. Congress can neither expand nor limit the Constitutional powers of the President and Congress may not authorize
the President to perform an act inconsistent with the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Regardless of these exceptions in the criminal statute the President
is, of course, still subject to the Constitutional limitations imposed
upon him by the Constitution. This Court is in full accord with
this rationale for it is axiomatic that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land. 108
The Government also has asserted that the President's authority originates from the Roosevelt directive of 1940 directing wiretapping in
cases involving subversive activities, and successive Presidents have
continued this practice. 10 7 Opponents retort that the fact successive
Presidents have authorized wiretapping to protect the security of the
nation in matters ranging from investigations of employee loyalty, dissident organizations, and organized crime, to the conduct of espionage, does not in itself make the authorization constitutional. 0 8 Further,
103 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971). See
generally Reed, Warrantless Searches in Light of Chimel: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 11 ARZ. L. REv. 475 (1969).
104 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); United
States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
105 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319, 57 S. Ct. 216, 220,
81 L. Ed. 255, 262 (1936), citing 8 U.S. Senate Reports 24, Committee on Foreign Relations.
106 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 6 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971); citing
United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 4 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
107 Id. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363, 88 S. Ct. 507, 518, 19 L. Ed.2d 576, 589
(1967), Justice White's concurring opinion: "Wiretapping to protect the security of the
nation has been authorized by successive presidents."
108 Id. In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L.
Ed. 1153 (1952) the Government had similarly contended the exercise of the president's

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2022], No. 1, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:65

the directive may have been constitutional in 1940 when wiretapping
was not recognized as a violation of the fourth amendment, but in
light of Katz, the directive has been superseded by higher authority.10 9
In a 1950 Supreme Court decision, the Court balanced the interest
of the public security against the partial abridgement of a Constitutional right, and determined that the interest of the public prevailed."10
The Court found an internal organization to be a "conspiratorial and
revolutionary junta, organized to reach ends . . . [or] and to use

methods which are incompatible with our constitutional system.""'
This organization was said to constitute a threat to overthrow the
established Government by force or other illegal methods, and the
Court determined that the interest of the public took precedence over
an individual right to the protection of the first amendment.
[T]he right of the public to be protected from evils of conduct,
even though First Amendment rights of persons or groups are
thereby in some manner infringed, has received frequent and consistent recognition by this Court....
Those organizations whose goal is to subvert the interest of the
public cannot be free2 from all regulations merely because they are'
a political activity."
The Court quoted Chief Justice Hughes' comment relating to civil
liberties and the need for public order:
inherent constitutional power to take possession of private property was supported by
historical precedent. The Court ruled that regardless of what powers successive presidents
had assumed, the powers must emanate from the Constitution since the president can
exercise no power not derived from the instrument itself.
109 See generally United States v. O'Baugh, 304 F. Supp. 767 (D. D.C. 1969). United States
v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75 (D. D.C. 1969).
110 American Communication, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925
(1950). This case pertains to a legislative grant of power to the President and the balancing
of the national interests with the first amendment. Although the Court in Robel v. United
States, 389 U.S. 658t 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed.2d 508 (1967), determined that a statute, which
was similar to that found constitutional in Douds, had an inhibiting effect on the exercise
of first amendment rights and the Court in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 68, 90
S. Ct. 355, 358, 24 L. Ed.2d 264, 268 (1968), stated that Douds "belongs to a discredited
regime," the decision has never been officially overruled. It is possible that the Government
could rely on the balancing of interest concept and decide that the warrant requirement
is not applicable in domestic affairs when national security is at stake. Although Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951), NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and Communist Party in the United
States v. Subversive Activities, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S. Ct. 1357, 6 L. Ed.2d 625 (1961), illustrate
the balancing of rights theory in a more detailed and analytical manner, Douds is presented as an example of the concept because of the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Jackson. Justice Jackson foresaw the far-reaching effect the decision could have and
attempted to prevent its application in national security cases involving domestic political
organizations. Whether the basic concept of balancing of rights was completely emasculated
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed.2d 438 (1969), remains an
open question. But cf. Comment, Eavesdropping at the Government's Discretion-First
Amendment Implications of the National Security Eavesdropping Power, 56 CORNELL L.
REv. 161 (1970).
MIiId. at 424, 70 S. Ct. at 696, 94 L. Ed. at 957.
112 Id. at 398, 70 S. Ct. at 683, 94 L. Ed. at 943.
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Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. 118
To apply the Balancing of Rights theory to warrantless wiretapping,
it would have to be shown that the fourth amendment is dependent, as
is the first amendment, upon the power of the Constitutional government to survive. There must be proof that the abridgement of the
fourth amendment right is limited in scope and the protection afforded
to the public is substantial. It must be clearly established that the protection against the overthrow of the Constitution by force or other illegal
means prevails over the minor deprivation or infringement of the
domestic dissident's right to be free from wiretapping.
[W]hile the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual
114
rights, it is not a suicide pact.
THE CURRENT APPROACH TO THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO
AUTHORIZE WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING IN MATTERS
OF INTERNAL SECURITY

In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court acknowledged the problem of warrantless wiretapping in national security cases, but left the
question unresolved. 1 5 In a concurring opinion, Justice White stated:

We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's
judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal
officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of
national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable. 11
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan objected to this view claiming
it would give the President a wholly unwarranted green light to resort
7
to wiretapping in any cases he labels as "national security" matters."
Justice Douglas and Brennan claim that the President is not as de118
tached and neutral as a magistrate must be.
In Giordana v. United States,119 the Court again admitted that the

issue of warrantless wiretapping in national security matters remains
open. "'[W]e have left that threshold question for the District Courts
113 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 US. 569, 574, 61 S. Ct. 762, 765, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 1052
(1941).
114 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 872 U.S. 144, 159, 83 S. Ct. 554, 563, 9 L. Ed.2d 644,
656 (1963).
115 383 U.S. 347, 358, n.23, 88 S. Ct. 507, 515, n.23, 19 L. Ed.2d 576, 586, n.23 (1967).
116 Id. at 364, 88 S. Ct. at 518, 19 L. Ed.2d at 589.
117 Id. at 359, 88 S. Ct. at 515, 19 L. Ed.2d at 587.
118 Id. at 360, 88 S. Ct. at 516, 19 L. Ed.2d at 587.
119 394 U.S. 310, 89 S. Ct. 1163, 22 L. Ed.2d 297 (1969).
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to decide .. ."120 There have been four district court cases which have
ruled on this "threshold question." Two of them have agreed with
Justice White's viewpoint' 2 ' and two have held that the President does
not have the power to authorize wiretapping without warrant in wholly
domestic situations.

122

In United States v. Smith, the Federal District Court of California
determined:
[S]ince there is no reason why the government could not have
complied with this requirement [warrant] by obtaining the impartial judgment of a court before conducting the electronic
surveillance in question here, it was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment ....

This court is forced to conclude that in

wholly domestic situations there is no national security exemption
23
from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
The court discussed the Government's theories that (1) the President
has inherent Constitutional power, (2) the 1968 Crime Control Act
excepted the President from the warrant requirement, (3) the fourth
amendment prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures," and
the contention (4) "that the decision to initiate surveillance in this
type of case must be based on a wide variety of considerations and on
many pieces of information which cannot be presented to a magistrate."
Judge Ferguson responded to these contentions:
(1) The President may have the inherent constitutional
power
124
in foreign affairs but he is limited in domestic affairs.
(2) Omnibus cannot exempt the President from complying
with the Constitution. "[T]he President is, of course, still subject
to the constitutional
limitations imposed upon him by the Fourth
25
Amendment.'

'1

(3) Chimel established the warrant requirement as not merely
one method of satisfying the "reasonable requirement" but it is
the only method other than justified by absolute necessity. 26
(4) "This seems to be an attempt to invoke the 'practicality'
exception to the warrant procedure. In cases involving foreign affairs this argument might very well prevail. In that situation,
numerous non-judicial factors are relevant and the decision would
probably be far removed from the consideration of probable cause.
Id. at 314, 89 S. Ct. at 1165, 22 L. Ed.2d at 300.
121 United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970);
United States v. O'Neal, Criminal No. KC-CR-1204 (D. Kan., September 1, 1970).
122 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971); United
States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
123 United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 4277-CD, 12 (C.D. Cal., January 8, 1971).
124 Id. at 6.
125 Id. at 4.
126 Id. at 7.
120
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However, this argument is totally inapplicable in a criminal pro127
ceeding in a federal court involving a domestic situation."'
The court discussed another problem that was not determinative of
the case but an answer to the Government's assertion that the President cannot recognize limitations on his power to act in national security matters established by the judiciary. The court acknowledged
that this might hold true in foreign affairs but it is not applicable in
domestic situations.
[L]imitations which are artificial in the international sphere, are
reasonable and proper when solely domestic subversion is involved.
In the domestic area, it is important to remember that there are
numerous questions which cannot be answered by recognition of
the importance of the national security. The Constitution .....
was written so as to strike a balance between the protection of
political freedom and the protection of the national security
interest. To guarantee political freedom, our forefathers agreed to
take certain risks which are inherent in a free democracy. It is unthinkable that we should now be required to sacrifice those freedoms in order to defend them. The court, therefore, finds that the
electronic 128
surveillance conducted in this case was constitutionally
improper.
In United States v. Sinclair, three White Panthers were charged with
bombing an office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The district
court substantially relied on the California decision and determined
that the Government violated the fourth amendment by wiretapping
1 29
the domestic dissidents without prior judicial authorization.
In the opinion of this Court, the position of the Attorney General
is untenable. It is supported neither historically, nor by the language of the Omnibus Crime Act. Such power held by one individual was never contemplated by the framers of our Constitution
and cannot be tolerated today. This Court adopts the 0holding of
Judge Warren J. Ferguson in United States v. Smith.13
In the Chicago Riots case,131 the defendant Dellinger argued that the
surveillances authorized by the President without warrant against
"home-grown organizations" were illegal and made a motion for disclosure of all the illegal surveillances. The defendant claimed that the
anti-war demonstrators were solely domestic organizations, not akin
to any foreign nation, and the President exceeded his Constitutional
127d. at 10.

Id. at 14.
United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
130 Id. at 10.
131 United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970).
128
129
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powers in authorizing the wiretap.3 2 The Government contended that.
the surveillances were legal in that they were authorized by the President in the valid exercise of his national defense power.
It is notorious that there are organizations in this country which
intend to 'attack and subvert the existing form of our government.' Moreover, there has been an 'increasing number of instances in which federal troops have been called upon by the states
to aid in the suppression of riots.' In such state of affairs, it is both
'reasonable (hence permissible under the Fourth Amendment) and
within the inherent power of the executive' to utilize electronic
surveillance to gather intelligence information in order to protect
the nation from danger. Moreover, the determination to take that
step 'comes within the competence of the executive' and the warrant procedure is inappropriate because it would require the judiciary to make determinations, such as appraisal of danger to the
3
national security, for which it is ill-suited.1 3
The Government further contended that most of the overheard conversation took place before Katz which has been determined to be
wholly prospective. The Government reasoned that prior to Katz, wiretapping was not prohibited by the fourth amendment, therefore,
the Roosevelt directive was controlling. 34 Further, the Government
claimed they had no intention of introducing the evidence at the
trial thus Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was inap135
plicable.
! The court determined that the defendant was not entitled
to disclosure under Alderman, since Alderman directed only the disclosure
of illegally obtained information and the evidence now in question
was obtained legally by the Government. 13 Similarly, in United States
37
v. O'Neal,1
the district judge made an in court ruling that surveillance carried out pursuant to the authorization by the President involving the President's national security power is lawful. The courts
in Dellinger and O'Neal concluded that the President's national security power includes domestic dissidents as well as hostile foreign
nations.
CONCLUSION

In the field of foreign affairs, the President has plenary powers which
cannot be limited by the judiciary, but in the domestic area, he is
182 Id.
133 Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 194-95 (1969).
134 United States v. Dellinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., February 20, 1970).
135 Id.
136 Id.
18T Criminal No. KC-CR-1204 (D.C. Kan., September 1, 1970).
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severely restricted. The President does not have any residuum of power
to act in wholly internal matters which he deems to be a matter of
national security. The fourth amendment requires prior authorization
by a magistrate in order to satisfy the "reasonableness requirement."
There is a presumption of unreasonableness in the absence of a search
warrant.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate.
In matters where they believe national security may be involved
they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a magistrate
must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously investigate and prevent
breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the
pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are
parties cast in the role of adversary, in national
properly interested
13 8
security cases.

There is no justifiable reason to allow the Government to circumvent the requirements of the fourth amendment in domestic matters.
The President has never claimed that he need not act in subordination
to the Constitution but he has, nevertheless authorized wiretapping
without a warrant.
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.

. .

.If the

government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. 1 9
Writs of assistance and general warrants have been called puny
140
instruments of tyranny and oppression compared with wiretapping.
The framers of the Constitution "conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.1' 14 ' It would seem that in order

to tolerate an infringement of this right, the public should at least be
insulated from unreasonable and arbitrary intrusions. Judicial control
could protect the public against overzealous defenders of the national
security.
In National Security Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An
Elusive Exception,142 the authors expressed the fear that the National
138 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed.2d 576, 587
(1967).
189 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944, 960
(1928) (Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion).
140 Id. at 476, 48 S.Ct. at 571, 72 L. Ed. at 955.
141 Id. at 478, 48 S.Ct. at 572, 72 L. Ed. at 956.
142 Theoharis and Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L.R. 749, 759 (1968).
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Security provision would be primarily directed against internal political
organizations such as the Black Power movement and the peace movement.1 43 This fear has become a reality. The Attorney General has
stated that he considers the national security eavesdropping power 1to
44
be applicable in investigations against domestic dissident radicals.
This power was used by the Government against the peace demonstrators in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of 1968,
and was used in investigations against the Black Panthers. 145 The
Government did not deem it necessary to secure a warrant since the
Attorney General had authorized the surveillances under the authority
of the President's national security powers.
The fourth amendment could be satisfied by submitting a warrant
application to a magistrate specifying the details of the offense, the
location of the proposed eavesdrop, the type of communication to be
seized, the identities of the parties and the duration of the eavesdrop.
If the magistrate feels that there is probable cause, the Government
would be free to eavesdrop for a limited period.
Through this procedure ...
we as citizens are assured of our constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Prior to the issuance of any search warrant the Court must
independently review the request to search and make an objective
determination whether or not probable cause of some criminal
activity exists, which activity would make the search reasonable
and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights. Absent
such a requirement of an objective determination by a magistrate,
law enforcement officials would be permitted to make their own
evaluation as to the reasonableness, the scope and the evidence of
probable cause for a search. This Court is loath to tolerate the
1 46
existence of such a condition.
148 Id. at 771.
144 Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,

118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969).
145 Id.
146 United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375, 7-8 (E.D. Mich., January 26, 1971).
ADDENDUM
United States v. Sinclair has been affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. The Attorney General has announced that he will appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court.
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